

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 2158

EXDIS

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TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJ: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS

TTBT/PNE MESSAGE NUMBER TWELVE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BUCHHEIM STATEMENT DELIVERED AT
FEBRUARY 17 PLENARY:

BEGIN TEXT: IN THE PLENARIES OF LAST WEEK WE OUTLINED THE US
POSITION ON THE LIMITATION VERIFICATION OF CONTAINED PNES. TO
HELP YOU UNDERSTAND MORE FULLY OUR APPROACH TO VERIFICATION,
IT MAY BE USEFUL IF I REVIEW CERTAIN ASPECTS OF OUR POSITION.

ONE FUNDAMENTAL ASPECT OF OUR APPROACH TO THE VERIFICATION OF
CONTAINED PNES IS OUR CONVICTION THAT THERE ARE NO FEASIBLE
MEANS TO ASSURE THAT WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS COULD NOT BE
OBTAINED FROM A CONTAINED EXPLOSION. ACCORDINGLY, WE MUST BE
ASSURED THAT CONTAINED PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS PERMITTED
UNDER ARTICLE III OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY HAVE A
YIELD LOWER THAN THE AGREED THRESHOLD CALLED FOR IN THAT
TREATY. ANOTHER FUNDAMENTAL ASPECT OF OUR APPROACH TO THE
VERIFICATION OF PNES FOLLOWS FROM CERTAIN OTHER PROVISIONS OF
THE TREATY. THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY PROVIDES THAT NUCLEAR
WEAPON TESTS SHALL BE CONDUCTED SOLELY WITHIN SPECIFIED TESTING
AREAS. THEREFORE THE ONLY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS THAT CAN BE

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CONDUCTED OUTSIDE THE SPECIFIED TESTING AREAS ARE THOSE THAT

HAVE A PEACEFUL PURPOSE. IF THE RESTRICTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS TO SPECIFIED TEST SITES IS TO BE MEANINGFUL, THOSE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WHICH ARE TO BE CONDUCTED AWAY FROM THE SPECIFIED TEST SITES MUST HAVE A SPECIFIC PEACEFUL PURPOSE WHICH IS CLEARLY RECOGNIZABLE BY THE OTHER PARTY.

IT IS FROM THESE TWO FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS THAT WE DRAW OUR APPROACH TO THE VERIFICATION OF CONTAINED PNES.

IT WAS RECOGNIZED BY BOTH SIDES IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS OF LAST JUNE AND JULY THAT LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS TO SPECIFIED TEST SITES WOULD SIMPLIFY THE PROCESS OF VERIFICATION AND INCREASE THE ACCURACY OF YIELD DETERMINATION OF UNDERGROUND WEAPON TESTS. I DO NOT BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE NECESSARY FOR US TO REPEAT AGAIN THE SEISMOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS WHICH WE HAVE HAD. LET ME, HOWEVER, RECALL THE WORDS OF MR. GALITCH, WHO IN THE PLENARY OF JUNE 6, SUMMED UP THE ISSUES MOST CONCISELY. HE SAID THAT LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS AT SPECIFIED TEST SITES WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION FOR SEVERAL REASONS. MR. GALITCH SAID, "FIRST, IT FACILITATES THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR VERIFICATION. IT MAKES IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES MORE EFFECTIVE. EXPERIMENTAL DATA ARE EASIER TO USE WHEN THEY INVOLVE ONLY A SINGLE AREA. MONITORING BY A NETWORK IS MADE MORE RELIABLE. ERRORS IN THE YIELD-SEISMIC MAGNITUDE RELATIONSHIP ARE REDUCED. THERE WOULD BE GREATER ACCURACY IN YIELD DETERMINATION RESULTING IN LOWER ERRORS IN THE DETERMINATION OF MAGNITUDE."

FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT, AS WE STATED IN THE PLENARY OF FEBRUARY 12, THE DETERMINATION OF THE YIELD OF A CONTAINED PNE IS MORE UNCERTAIN THAN FOR EXPLOSIONS CONDUCTED AT SPECIFIED NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST SITES UNDER THE TERMS OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY OF JULY 1974. IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT WE BELIEVE THE TOTAL AGGREGATE YIELD OF CONTAINED PNE EVENTS MUST BE LIMITED TO NO MORE THAN 100 KILOTONS AND THAT WE MUST BE ABLE TO CONFIRM THE ACTUAL YIELD OF THE EXPLOSION WITH REASONABLE CONFIDENCE. IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THE INFORMATION WHICH WE HAVE SPECIFIED TO BE EXCHANGED IS NEEDED IN ORDER ADEQUATELY TO ESTIMATE THE YIELD OF THE EXPLOSION. WE FURTHER BELIEVE THAT OBSERVERS ARE NEEDED TO VERIFY THAT DATA.

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THE OTHER BASIC PURPOSE OF THE OBSERVERS IS TO VERIFY THAT THE LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE PNE SITE ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE STATED PURPOSE OF THE EVENT.

I WISH TO EXPLICITLY MENTION A TWO-PART POINT WHICH WE HAVE IDENTIFIED IN OUR CONSIDERATIONS OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENT TERMS, AND WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE CONSISTENT WITH REMARKS ALREADY

MADE BY YOU, MR. IMINISTER. WE SHOULD AGREE THAT DEVELOPMENT TESTS OF EXPLOSIVE DEVICES FOR CONTAINED PNE'S SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT ONLY WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF SPECIFIED WEAPON TEST SITES. FURTHER, THE STATEMENT OF PURPOSE ABOUT A PNE PROJECT SHOULD SAY WHETHER IT IS AN EXPERIMENT TO DEVELOP AN APPLICATION TECHNIQUE OR AN APPLICATION OF AN ESTABLISHED TECHNIQUE.

I WOULD NOW LIKE TO RESPOND TO SOME OF THE QUESTIONS ADDRESSED TO US BY MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT OUR LAST PLENARY, FEBRUARY 14.

DR. SAFRONOV ASKED WHAT THE CRITERIA WOULD BE FOR DETERMINING WHETHER AN EXPLOSION AWAY FROM THE TEST SITE IS PEACEFUL OR NON-PEACEFUL, AND HE ASKED WHAT THE PURPOSE WOULD BE OF VERIFYING THE YIELD OF AN EXPLOSION CARRIED OUT AWAY FROM THE TEST SITE AND WHAT ACCURACY IS REQUIRED. I WOULD ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS BY RESTATING THE CRITERIA WHICH WE FEEL MUST BE MET TO ASSURE THAT AN EXPLOSION AWAY FROM THE TEST SITE DOES NOT PROVIDE WEAPON BENEFITS PRECLUDED BY THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY OF JULY 3, 1974. FIRST, WE MUST HAVE ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT THE YIELD OF THE EVENT IS LESS THAN 150 KILOTONS. BECAUSE THE ACCURACY OF YIELD ESTIMATION IS NOT AS GOOD AWAY FROM THE TEST SITE AS ON THE TEST SITE, WE HAVE STRUCTURED OUR PROPOSAL IN TERMS OF YIELD LIMITATION, DATA EXCHANGE AND OBSERVATION SO THAT WE CAN HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME ASSURANCE OF THE ESTIMATED YIELD OF CONTAINED PNES AS WE WOULD FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS AT THE SPECIFIED TEST SITES UNDER THE TERMS OF THE TREATY OF JULY 3. THE SECOND CRITERION IS THAT THE SIDES SHOULD BE ABLE TO VERIFY THAT THE LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE PNE SITE ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE STATED PURPOSE OF THE EVENT. THESE ARE OUR CRITERIA.

DR. SAFRONOV ASKED WHY INFORMATION WOULD BE REQUIRED TWICE --
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FIRST PROVIDED IN ADVANCE AND THEN OBTAINED BY OBSERVERS. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED IS TO IMPROVE THE ACCURACY OF YIELD ESTIMATION. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS TO CONFIRM THE VALIDITY OF ALL OF THIS INFORMATION. ACCORDINGLY, THE PURPOSE OF OBSERVATION IS TO CONFIRM BY INDEPENDENT OBSERVATION THE CORRECTNESS OF THE INFORMATION SUPPLIED.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 2158

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TTBT/PNE MESSAGE NUMBER TWELVE

DR. MYASNIKOV ASKED IF THE GEOLOGICAL SAMPLES COULD NOT BE PROVIDED FROM THE SMALL DIAMETER EXPLORATORY DRILL HOLES RATHER THAN THE EMPLACEMENT SHAFT. WE UNDERSTAND THE TECHNICAL ISSUE HERE. APPROPRIATE GEOLOGICAL SAMPLES OR CORES COULD BE PROVIDED FROM NEARBY EXPLORATORY DRILL HOLES. IF THIS WERE DONE, CORE SAMPLES FROM THE EMPLACEMENT HOLE WOULD PROBABLY NOT NEED TO BE TAKEN. THE ROLE OF THE OBSERVERS WOULD BE TO CONFIRM THE INFORMATION GAINED FROM THE EXPLORATORY DRILL HOLES BY EXAMINATION OF CUTTINGS AND CHIPS FROM THE EMPLACEMENT SHAFT DURING THE LAST STAGE OF DRILLING. THIS LAST STAGE OF DRILLING WOULD CORRESPOND TO A DISTANCE OF 2 TO 3 TIMES THE EXPECTED CAVITY RADIUS ABOUT THE SHOT POINT.

DR. MYASNIKOV ASKED WITHIN WHAT RADIUS OF THE SITE OF A CONTAINED PNE EVENT THE OBSERVERS WOULD OPERATE. WE WILL NOT PROPOSE AT THIS TIME A SPECIFIC RADIUS. HOWEVER, THE AREA OF OBSERVATION WOULD BE IN THE IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE EXPLOSION AND ITS ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION.

MR. MINISTER, I HOPE THESE REMARKS HAVE HELPED TO CLARIFY FOR YOU THE US PROPOSAL. IF THERE ARE FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROCEDURES WE PROPOSE, WE WOULD WELCOME THEM. THE US APPROACH HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO SERVE OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS SO THAT BOTH PARTIES CAN HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT PURPOSED OF THE THRESHOLD TEST

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BAN TREATY OF JULY 3 ARE BEING SERVED. END TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING PERIOD OF DISCUSSION AND QUESTIONS, BUCHHEIM
PRESENTED FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL STATEMENT.

3. BEGIN TEXT. OUR STATEMENT TODAY COMPLETES OUR PRESENTATION
OF THE MAIN POINTS IN OUR PROPOSAL FOR GOVERNING CONTAINED PNES
UNDER ARTICLE III OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY OF JULY 3,
1974. WE CAN ADD DETAILS AS NECESSARY AND, OF COURSE, WE
ANTICIPATE THAT YOUR SIDE WILL HAVE FURTHER QUESTIONS AND
COMMENTS.

ON WEDNESDAY WE PLAN TO PRESENT AN OUTLINE OF OUR PROPOSAL
WITH RESPECT TO EXCAVATION PNES.

TODAY, I WISH TO MAKE A SHORT STATEMENT ABOUT THE BASIS FOR
OUR PROPOSAL ON EXCAVATION PNES.

AS WE HAVE SAID SEVERAL TIMES IN THESE MEETINGS, WE HAVE THREE
CRITERIA FOR A PNE AGREEMENT IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE III
OF THE TREATY OF JULY 1974. THESE ARE:

1. PNES MUST NOT PROVIDE WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS OTHER-
WISE PRECLUDED OR LIMITED BY THE TTBT.

2. THE FACT THAT PNE ACTIVITIES ARE NOT CONTRIBUTING TO
SUCH BENEFITS MUST BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE.

3. THE AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH EXISTING TREATY
OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE LIMITED TEST BAN
TREATY OF 1963.

I HAVE TAKEN THE TIME TO REPEAT OUR THREE CRITERIA IN FULL
BECAUSE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE BE CLEAR ABOUT THIS BASIC POINT:
THE PROPOSAL WE PLAN TO INTRODUCE ON FEBRUARY 19TH IS EXPLICITLY
DESIGNED TO CONFORM WITH THE FIRST TWO OF OUR CRITERIA -- THOSE
DEALING WITH POSSIBLE WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS. END TEXT.

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